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COMMENT
Regulating in the Shadow of the U.C.C.: How Courts
Should Interpret State Consumer Protection Laws
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) Article 9 governs the taking of
security interests in personal property; all fifty states have consumer protection
statutes, which also govern the taking of security interests in personal property.
The requirements of these two statutes are often redundant or mutually
exclusive. For secured creditors and borrowers, exactly which statute actually
governs their transaction is often uncertain.
The U.C.C. theoretically has a solution to this problem. U.C.C. section
9-201 provides: "In case of conflict between this article and a rule of law,
statute, or regulation described in subsection (b) [a state consumer protection
law], the rule of law, statute, or regulation controls." If there is "conflict"
between a consumer protection statute and U.C.C. Article 9, then the
consumer protection statute should "control." Superficially, this is clear. In
practice, it is not. When exactly is there a "conflict" between the U.C.C. and a
consumer protection law? And what exactly does it mean for the consumer
protection statute to "control"?
This level of confusion will soon increase. Revised Article 2 of the U.C.C.
includes a new provision, section 2-108, that is the parallel of section 9-201. 1
Section 2-1o8 substitutes the word "govern" but is otherwise identical,
providing that a consumer protection law that "conflicts" with Article 2 will
"govern" in its place.
1. In this Comment, I repeatedly refer to the "former" and "revised" versions of Article 2 and
Article 9. If I refer to a provision without using the words "former" or "revised," that means
the provision under discussion is essentially the same under both versions.
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The scope of this problem is large. Courts across the country have
struggled with the meaning of section 9-2O1.2 For lenders and borrowers, it is
simply not clear which statute governs. And, as I will demonstrate, the U.C.C.
and consumer protection statutes often impose radically different
requirements. The confusion is harmful for both lenders and debtors. For
lenders, it means added transaction costs and a concomitant decreased
willingness to extend credit. For borrowers, it means weakened consumer
protections. The expansion of this statutory arrangement to Article 2 will
multiply the confusion. Article 9 applies only to secured transactions, while
Article 2 applies to all purchases and sales, an even larger universe of
transactions.
This Comment proposes a route out of this confusion. I present a method
to define "conflict" and "control,"' dividing responsibility between the U.C.C.
and state consumer protection laws in a way that will preserve and enhance
state powers to protect consumers while also protecting the integrity and
purpose of the U.C.C.
I. AN EXAMPLE: REPOSSESSION RULES
A sample case will illustrate the problem. In Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Edwards,4 the Maryland Court of Appeals (that state's highest court)
adjudicated the boundary line between the U.C.C. and a state consumer
protection law. U.C.C. Article 9 governs security interests in personal property.
2. Here is a list of just some of the cases that have dealt with the issue of when the U.C.C.
controls and when state consumer protection laws control: First Nat'l Bank of Boston v.
Viking Maritec, Inc., No. 93-1336, 1993 WL 292996 (E.D. La. July 26, 1993); First
Commercial Corp. v. First Nat'l Bancorporation, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 1430 (D. Colo. 1983); In
re Smith, 401 B.R. 343 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 20o8); In re Cohrs, No. 07-214 31A13G, 2007 WL
205098o (Bankr. E.D. Cal. June 25, 2007); In re Anderson, 348 B.R. 652 (Bankr. D. Del.
20o6); Bank of Am. v. Lallana, 96o P.2d 1133 (Cal. 1998); Suburbia Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Bel-Air Conditioning Co., 385 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 198o); Johnson Co. Auto
Credit, Inc. v. Green, 83 P. 3d 152 (Kan. 2004); Medling v. Wecoe Credit Union, 678 P.2d
1115 (Kan. 1984); Kelley v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 678 P.2d 62o (Kan. 1984); Kline v. Cent.
Motors Dodge, Inc., 614 A.2d 1313 (Md. 1992); B&S Mktg. Enter., LLC v. Consumer
Protection Div., 835 A.2d 215 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003); Dean v. Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp., 275 A.2d 154 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1971); Euclid Nat'l Bank v. Watson, C.A. No. 2481, 1977
WL 198763 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1977); Sterling Acceptance Co. v. Grimes, 168 A.2d 6oo
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1961); First Nat'l Bank of Millville v. Horwatt, 162 A.2d 6o (Pa. Super. Ct.
196o); GMC Superior Trucks, Inc. v. Irving Bank & Trust Co., 463 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1971).
. "Conflict" and "control" are replaced by "conflict" and "govern" in Article 2.
4. 4 85 A.2d iOO (Md. 1985).
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If a debtor holding secured property defaults, a secured creditor is usually
entitled to repossess the property.' After fulfilling certain requirements, the
creditor is allowed to sell the repossessed property, using the proceeds of sale
to cover the debtor's debt.
6
After repossessing the property, the secured creditor cannot immediately
sell it. The U.C.C. requires that the secured creditor notify the debtor of the
impending sale.7 In the case of a public sale (for example, auction), former
section 9-504 provided that "reasonable notification of the time and place of any
public sale ... shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor."'
Frequently, state statutes impose notice requirements with different
language. Maryland's Retail Installment Sales Act (RISA)9 statute, for
instance, provides that, before any repossessed collateral may be sold, the
secured creditor (and repossesser) must deliver a notice to the debtor
informing her (1) that she has the right to redeem the repossessed goods upon
payment; (2) that she may be liable for a deficiency after the goods are sold;
and (3) of the location where the goods are stored."° Note that the Maryland
statute, unlike the U.C.C., does not require notification of the time and place of
a public sale. Rather, the RISA statute imposes its own, substantively different
notification requirements.
Maryland's version of section 9-201 includes the usual "conflict" and
"control" language, providing that "in the case of conflict between the
provisions of this title [the U.C.C.] and any such [state consumer protection
statutes], the provisions of such statute control.""
Superficially, the U.C.C. and RISA requirements do not "conflict." They
are certainly redundant-and perhaps at cross-purposes -but at worst they
supplement each other. Nevertheless, the existence of both the Maryland statute
and the U.C.C. begs the following questions: Does a secured creditor have to
comply with just one statute? Both? Parts of each? Does the consumer have a
remedy if the lender chooses to comply selectively?
5. U.C.C. § 9-6o9 (2000) (revised).
6. Id. § 9-6o8.
7. Id. § 9-611.
8. U.C.C. § 9-504 (1996) (emphasis added). I am using former Article 9 for this example
because that was the version enacted in Maryland at the time of this case.
9. RISAs are a common type of state consumer protection law.
1o. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW, S 12-624 (LexisNexis 1975).
ii. Id. S 9-203 (emphasis added).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The Maryland Court of Appeals decided that "conflict" meant that RISA,
where relevant, totally displaced the U.C.C. 12 Therefore, the U.C.C. notice
requirements had no significance in this case. The secured creditor only had to
comply with the lesser RISA requirements, and did not have to inform the
debtor of, for instance, the place where the collateral would be sold.
Another example will illustrate a different conception of "conflict" and
"control." After a secured creditor has repossessed and then sold the debtor's
collateral, the proceeds of the sale often do not cover the debt. In such cases,
the debtor is liable for this deficiency. 3 In a small minority of cases, the sale of
collateral will actually produce more money than the size of the debt. In these
cases, under the U.C.C., the debtor is entitled to the surplus. 4
Under some consumer protection statutes, the procedure is different. An
example from a Pennsylvania case, Whiteman v. Degnan Chevrolet, Inc.,'" is
illustrative. At the time of the case in question, Pennsylvania's version of
former U.C.C. section 9-504 provided that, after the secured party had
repossessed the collateral and sold it, "the secured party must account to the
debtor for any surplus."'6
If there was a surplus after the disposition of the collateral, the secured
creditor had to turn over any surplus to the debtor. Under Pennsylvania's
Motor Vehicles Sales Finance Act (MVSFA), there was no provision requiring
any surplus go to the debtor. Rather, Pennsylvania's MVSFA provided that, if
the buyer did not redeem the repossessed car within fifteen days "the buyer
shall forfeit all claim to such motor vehicle and collateral security." 7
The MVSFA does mention what happens in the event of a deficiency
(providing a procedure whereby the creditor can sue the debtor for it),"8 but
there is no specific mention of a surplus. The closest mention is the excerpt
quoted above, which may imply that the buyer has no right to any surplus (the
language "forfeit all claim"), but which is, in any event, ambiguous. As in the
Maryland case above, Pennsylvania's version of the U.C.C.' 9 dictates that the
state statute "controls" in the event of a "conflict."
12. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Edwards, 485 A.2d lolo, 1013 (Md. 1985).
13. U.C.C. § 9-608 (2000). This provision exists in both former and revised Article 9.
14. Id.
15. 272A.2d 244 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1970).
16. IzA PA. STAT. ANN. § 9-503 (West 1954) (emphasis added).
17. 69 PA. CONS. STAT. § 626 (2004).
18. Id. § 627.
19. Note that in this case Pennsylvania is working with former Article 9, in which 9-203(4) was
analogous to revised 9-201.
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The Whiteman court held that the MVSFA did not address the issue of a
surplus. Therefore, the U.C.C. governed, and the debtor was entitled to the
surplus. This reasoning is questionable, as the MVSFA does address the issue
of deficiencies. To hold that the MVSFA does not speak to surpluses implies a
strange asymmetry in the statute.
An interpretation that would seem more reasonable would hold that:
(1) the MVSFA should control over Article 9; (2) the MVSFA does not provide
for a surplus; and therefore, (3) a debtor is not entitled to a surplus. But that
result is no less bizarre. The MYSFA, ostensibly a consumer protection statute,
would leave the consumer worse off than under the U.C.C. Stranger still,
under the MVSFA, the secured creditor is actually better off if the debtor
defaults than if she pays -on default, the secured creditor gets to keep any
extra value (what would normally be regarded as the debtor's equity in the
car).
Both of these situations demonstrate the interpretive problem posed by
state regulations set against the backdrop of the U.C.C. Revised section 9-201
and revised section 2-1o8 provide a way for states to create their own separate
rules for consumers, but the relationship between the U.C.C. and these other
statutes is uncertain. Such state statutes coexist uneasily with the U.C.C.
II. THE SOLUTION: CONTRADICTION OR DISPLACEMENT
A. The Interpretive Solution
In this Comment, I propose an interpretive schema to resolve this problem.
In particular, I will try to assign meaning to the words "conflict" and
"control."2" I argue that "conflict" can have two essential meanings: contradict
or displace. There are two ways that a consumer protection statute can
"conflict" with the U.C.C. First, the consumer protection statute can expressly
contradict a provision of the U.C.C. Or, second, the consumer protection
statute can displace the U.C.C. (or a provision thereof).
To illustrate my proposal, if the Pennsylvania MVSFA statute, instead of
not discussing the surplus issue at all, had read "the debtor is not entitled to
any surplus resulting from the holder's disposition of collateral," then Article 9
would be contradicted. Pennsylvania's MVSFA, in that hypothetical, would
affirmatively and expressly contradict the provision of the U.C.C. dealing with
surplus. The two provisions cannot coexist. There would be a "conflict"
2a. In the case of revised S 2-1o8, "govern" replaces "control."
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between the Article 9 surplus provision and the consumer protection provision
denying a surplus.
The principle is similar in the case of displacement."' I argue that a
provision of a consumer protection statute can displace a provision of the
U.C.C. if it occupies the same space as the U.C.C. provision. I argue that
displacement can occur in two situations. First, displacement occurs when a
consumer protection statute has an analogue to a U.C.C. provision. Second,
displacement occurs when a consumer protection provision, if controlling,
would prevent the functioning of a U.C.C. provision.'
The Ford Motor Credit case23 above is an example of analogue displacement.
The post-repossession, pre-sale notice requirements in Maryland's section
12-624 are very clearly an analogue of the Article 9 post-repossession, pre-sale
notice requirements. As such, under my schema, Maryland section 12-624
would displace the U.C.C. provision. There would be a "conflict" between the
two provisions.
For an example of the second type of displacement, what I will call
"preclusion displacement," imagine that a consumer protection law requires a
secured creditor, before repossession of collateral, to have pre-arranged a buyer
for the repossessed collateral (to have, in effect, already made the sale). After
the repossession, this hypothetical law requires the creditor to transfer the
collateral to the buyer immediately (and the proceeds of the sale would be used
against the debt). Under such a regulation, Article 9's post-repossession, pre-
sale notice provisions would have no place. To require a creditor to provide
notice to the debtor after the creditor had seized the collateral but before
disposing of it would not be possible - no such period of time would exist. The
consumer protection provision would preclude the functioning of the U.C.C.
provision. Here too, the consumer protection provision would displace the
U.C.C. provision, and there would be a "conflict" between the two.
21. This idea borrows slightly from the notion of "occupying the field" in the doctrine of
implied preemption. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2oo0)
(discussing conflict and "occupy the field" preemption).
22. The three ways that I propose a state consumer protection provision can displace a U.C.C.
provision (contradiction, analogue displacement, and preclusion displacement) are roughly
comparable, in the field of federal-state preemption, to express preemption, implied conflict
preemption, and implied "occupy the field" preemption. It is a mistake, though, to overstate
the similarities between the two issues. Federal preemption involves laws passed by two
distinct sovereign bodies (the states and the federal government), whereas the U.C.C. and
state consumer protection laws are passed by the same sovereign body (the states).
23. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Edwards, 485 A.2d loio (Md. 1985).
119:132 9 2010
REGULATING IN THE SHADOW OF THE U.C.C.






There is a "conflict" between a consumer protection law and the U.C.C. when
there is contradiction (when a consumer protection provision expressly
contradicts a provision of the U.C.C.), or when there is displacement. There is
displacement when a consumer protection provision precludes the operation of
a U.C.C. provision, or when the consumer protection provision provides a
complete analogue to a particular U.C.C. provision.
Determining the meaning of "control" in revised section 9-201 and
"govern" in revised section 2-1o8 is easier than determining the meaning of
"conflict" in those provisions. Using my schema, once a "conflict" is
determined to exist, the conflicted U.C.C. provisions are no longer relevant.
The transaction is solely governed by the consumer protection provisions with
which those U.C.C. provisions conflicted. In the immediately preceding
example, the consumer protection law's pre-arranged sale requirement would
"conflict" (by preclusion displacement) with the U.C.C. post-repossession,
pre-sale notice provision. The consumer protection provision would, therefore,
"control," meaning that the secured creditor would only have to comply with
the consumer protection provision and would have no duty to give post-
repossession, pre-sale notice to the debtor.
B. Why This Statutory Interpretation IsJustified
I shall make four arguments in favor of this schema, each grounded in the
language of the U.C.C. First, in its own text, the U.C.C. instructs courts that
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the U.C.C. "must be liberally construed."' Unless a competing state statute
includes similar language, a proper reading of the statutory text of the U.C.C.
and the state statute would favor giving extra deference and broader
construction to the U.C.C. The comments to section 1-103 suggest that courts




Second, section 1-103 specifically directs courts to construe the U.C.C.
liberally to promote its underlying "purposes and policies," which include "to
make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions." The value of
uniformity is to promote commerce across jurisdictions.26 Under the U.C.C.,
commercial parties need less legal research before deciding whether to do
business in another state. The U.C.C. enhances trade and promotes
commercial activity across state borders. This virtue is compromised by
variation. The more state statutes are allowed to control in place of the U.C.C.,
the less uniform commercial law will become. The U.C.C.'s express goal to
promote uniformity may entitle the U.C.C. to special deference when
construed together with other statutes.
Third, U.C.C. section 1-104 reads: "The Uniform Commercial Code being
a general act intended as a unified coverage of its subject matter, no part of it
shall be deemed to be impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation if such
construction can reasonably be avoided.""7 The U.C.C. is a "general act." The
implication of this statutory language (again duly enacted by the state
legislatures) is that the U.C.C., as a "general act," deserves some kind of special
priority relative to other nongeneral acts. The comment to section 1-104 bears
quoting in its entirety:
This section [1-104] embodies the policy that an act that bears evidence
of carefully considered permanent regulative intention should not
lightly be regarded as impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation. The
Uniform Commercial Code, carefully integrated and intended as a
uniform codification of permanent character covering an entire "field"
of law, is to be regarded as particularly resistant to implied repeal.
24. U.C.C. § 1-10 3 (1953).
25. Id. 5 1-103 cmt.1.
26. For a Supreme Court case discussing the uniformity rationale, see Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 623 (1978). For a general discussion of the value of
uniformity, see Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REv. 1567, 1631 (20o8).
27. U.C.C. § 1-104 (2005) (emphasis added).
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The U.C.C. has likely been more "carefully considered" and "carefully
integrated" than other state statutes. The drafters of the U.C.C. spent much
more time drafting the U.C.C. than did the drafters of state RISA statutes. 8
The difference means that the U.C.C. is generally more coherent than
idiosyncratic consumer protection statutes. As such, it should be given a
greater level of deference.
The final argument favoring the U.C.C.'s special interpretive status is one
for certainty. Going back to the text of section 1-1o3: "(a) [The U.C.C.] must
be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and
policies, which are: (1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing
commercial transactions." The U.C.C. should be construed so as to "clarify"
and "simplify" commercial law. The U.C.C. should be "liberally construed" to
accomplish those objectives. It follows naturally that the U.C.C.'s scope should
be interpreted broadly where failure to do so would promote unclear law and
complexity. That is exactly the situation faced by courts applying both the
U.C.C. and a consumer protection statute. Construing the U.C.C. coequally
with the other statute (or even as having a lesser priority) would promote
unclarity and confusion. Construing the U.C.C. weakly will leave contracting
parties uncertain as to how a court will judge their behavior. A secured creditor
in Pennsylvania (where the Whiteman surplus case was decided) cannot be sure
if she is entitled to keep the debtor's surplus or not. Operating only under
consumer protection, she may. But a secured creditor must fear that a court
will apply the U.C.C., and the court will accordingly give the debtor damages
for the creditor's failure to turn over a surplus.
CONCLUSION
The harms of the current system are clear. The present confusion hurts
both lenders and borrowers. For lenders, there are added transaction costs and
uncertainties about the legal treatment of any secured lending transaction
involving consumers. For consumers, a legislature's accidental failure to
include a provision in a consumer protection statute (for example, the surplus
provision at issue in Whiteman) can result in the consumer protection statute,
ostensibly enacted for the benefit of consumers, actually lowering protections
for them. Also, the added transaction costs of lending are borne, at least to
some extent, by the consumers. The uncertainty about which law governs
z8. On the drafting process of the U.C.C. consumer protection provisions, see Jean Braucher,
Politics and Principle in the Drafting of UCC Consumer Protection Provisions, 29 U.C.C. L.J. 68
(1996).
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makes it more difficult and expensive to litigate. As the costs of litigation rise, it
becomes more expensive for consumers to hire counsel to defend themselves
against claims by their creditors. Ambiguous consumer protection laws risk
encouraging larger, better-funded corporate parties to take advantage of that
ambiguity. Lenders may violate the rules because it is not clear what exactly the
rules are, and the costs of litigating an alleged violation are too high for most
consumers to bear.
This Comment has attempted to deal with the difficult question of how
courts should solve this problem, and how the courts should balance the liberal
construction of the U.C.C. commanded by sections 1-103 and 1-104 against the
deference mandated by sections 9-2Ol and revised 2-1o8. My answer is an
interpretive schema that looks at the U.C.C. as a whole, taking account of its
overall text, structure, and purpose.
To solve the confusion that has resulted from this problem, I have
proposed and advocated a schema that gives the U.C.C. special deference.
Under my schema, "conflict" between the U.C.C. and other state statutes exists
only in a limited number of situations -specifically, when the U.C.C. is
contradicted or displaced. This special deference is justified due to the statutory
construction rules within the text of the U.C.C.
HENRY BARKHAUSEN
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